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A reason is said to be “of the wrong kind” when, although it counts as a consideration 
broadly in favor of (or against) having an attitude it seems to not bear on the object of the attitude in 
a way that is relevant to determining whether the attitude is appropriate. For example, it seems to 
count in favor of admiring a bowl of mud that a demon offers me a huge sum of money to do so or 
threatens to kill me if I do not, but such considerations tell me nothing about the qualities of the 
bowl of mud that speak to its being admirable. When applied to belief it is often taken as a datum 
that the only genuine or “right” reasons for belief are those that bear directly on the question of 
“whether p”; such reasons are often called “evidential” “epistemic” or perhaps “truth-directed” or 
“alethic.” Considerations about whether it would be good or worthwhile to believe something, 
what I will term “practical reasons” may be reasons for another kind of attitude but, many 
contend, are not reasons for belief; they are the “wrong kind of reason” (WKR) for belief.  Wrong 
kinds of reasons may have the appearance of reasons, but are not genuine reasons. The challenge, 
or what is sometimes called “the wrong kind of reason problem” is to explain why these are the 
wrong kind of reasons, to find some criterion which will delineate the right kind from the wrong 
kind such that only evidential reasons end up as the right kind. If the wrong kind of reasons 
problem could be solved it would also reveal the truth of a position that is sometimes referred to as 
“evidentialism,” which states that the only reasons for belief are evidential and contrasts with 
“pragmatism” which states that there are at least some non-evidential reasons for belief.”1 
 Many solutions have been offered and rejected, but there is a general consensus that there 
is a real distinction here and the challenge is to construct a theory which captures it. I will argue 
that there is no distinction to capture, at least in the case of reasons for belief. If I am right this 
would help explain the problem’s seeming intractability. I will consider, in turn, three general 
strategies for showing why practical reasons are the wrong kind of reasons for belief and argue that 
none of them succeed. The first appeals to the nature of reasons; this is a highly generalized 
approach to the WKR problem that can then be applied to belief. The second appeals to the 
nature of belief, arguing that it is built in to what is it to be a belief that practical reasons are of the 
 
1 Nishi Shah defines evidentialism this way, namely as the view that “only evidence can be a reason 
for belief” and the pragmatist as one “committed to the existence of at least some non-evidential 
reasons for belief.” (Shah 2006, 482) Evidentialism is often used to describe a position about 
justification, and argues that beliefs are only justified if they are based on evidence; those opposed 
will offer examples where it appears that a belief can be justified without evidence. But anti-
evidentialists of this kind are often also anti-pragmatists and so evidentialists in Shah’s sense. How 
these two kinds of evidentialism are connected is an interesting question, one I hope to pursue in 
future work. It should also be noted that some who are committed to evidentialism as a theory of 
justification can allow that non-evidential reasons exist, but that these are not relevant when we are 
evaluating belief from an epistemic perspective, and that believing for such reasons will lead one 
away from rationality. This is, for example, Richard Feldman’s (2000) view.  I discuss and critique 
this view in Chapter 2 of Believing Against the Evidence. 
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wrong kind. The third appeals to the nature of the basing relation between a belief and a reason, 
arguing that this relation rules out practical reasons being reasons for belief. As we will see the 
division between these approaches is not a sharp one; there is much overlap between them but 
there is a clear difference in their emphases. Other papers which criticize possible solutions to the 
WKR problem end by suggesting we have more work to do and perhaps offer a direction to take in 
finding a successful solution. I end with a different suggestion; perhaps what is taken as a datum in 
need of explaining has been incorrectly identified. The distinction between good and bad reasons 
provides us with all the resources we need to make sense of cases that are used to motivate the 
WKR problem. There is no need to delineate a kind with feature x such that any reason which 
possesses feature x is thereby of the wrong kind. 
 
2. The nature of reasons and standards of correctness 
One way to diagnose the WKR problem, is to claim that it is primarily generated by a 
particular view about the nature of reasons, and to argue that an alternate view of reasons can offer 
a way out. Pamela Hieronymi’s discussion is most explicit in taking this approach. A common way 
of understanding what it means for something to be a reason for an attitude is that it is a 
consideration that “counts in favor” of that attitude. But if this is all that it takes to be a reason, it 
is hard to see how paradigmatically “wrong” kind of reasons, such as monetary incentives to 
believe something false, or to admire a bowl of mud, do not count in favor of believing or 
admiring. Hieronymi argues instead that a reason is better understood as a consideration that 
“bears on a question.”  We can sort reasons into different “kinds” by distinguishing between the 
kinds of questions on which different considerations can bear. In general, we can distinguish 
between questions concerning the content of the attitude and questions which ask directly 
whether the attitude in question would be good to have, e.g. whether x is admirable vs. whether it 
would be good to admire x.2 In the case of belief, it seems two different kinds of questions can be 
asked, one that bears on the content of the belief and one that bears on whether the belief would 
be good to have: “a consideration can count in favor of p by bearing on whether p or by bearing on 
whether the belief that p is in some way good to have.” (444)   
  Hieronymi rightly points out that the content/attitude distinction is not sufficient to do the 
kind of sorting needed to deal with the WKR problem. Questions about content can bear on the 
questions about whether the attitude is good to have and vice-versa. This can be seen most clearly 
when we think that in establishing whether p is true we also often find out that it would be a good 
belief to have (for having true beliefs is generally a good thing). A further distinction is needed to 
be able to properly sort reasons, according to Hieronymi, and she argues, that the relevant 
distinction is between reasons that are “constitutive” and those that are “extrinsic.” In the case of 
belief, reasons which one takes to show that the content of a belief is true are “constitutive;” 
finding such reasons convincing amounts to having the belief. These reasons are taken to settle the 
question “whether p” and, in settling that question, one believes p. All remaining reasons for 
believing p-those which (are taken to) count in favor of believing p independently of whether p are 
“extrinsic.” Finding these convincing does not amount to believing p. Considering that it would 
save your life if you believed the butler did it does not, according to Hieronymi, provide you with a 
reason to believe the butler did it. Rather, “by finding these reasons convincing, you form a 
second-order belief about the belief that butler did it: you believe it would be good to believe he 
did...This distinction between constitutive and extrinsic reasons for a belief that p marks the 
distinction between the "right kind" and the "wrong kind" of reasons for believing p. The right 
kind of reasons for believing p are those that (are taken to) bear on whether p-that is, those that 
 
2 This distinction is often put in terms of state given reasons and object given reasons. 
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(are taken to) bear on the question, the settling of which amounts to believing. Extrinsic reasons 
are not "really" reasons for believing p, we can say, because they are not the kind of reasons which, 
simply by finding convincing, one would believe p.” (448)  
If I take a consideration to bear on whether p, that is if I take a consideration to show it more 
or less likely that p is true, then, on this taxonomy it is the “right” kind. But is there any reason 
that just by its nature or content is excluded from bearing on whether p?  And in particular, why 
are practical reasons excluded as ones that can be taken to bear on whether p. If I take it that the 
fact that it would save my life makes it more likely that the butler did it then it would be a right 
kind of reason for belief. The inference “Believing the butler did it will save my life and so the 
butler did it” is probably a very bad inference, but we know people are capable of very faulty 
reasoning.3 Some argue that such inferences are psychologically or conceptually impossible but 
nothing Hieronymi says rules it out. 4 
Further, a consideration can bear on the truth of p without settling the question of whether p. 
In Hieronymi’s initial characterization it sounds like a reason must be convincing for it count as a 
right kind of reason, that only those reasons which actually settle the question of whether p are 
real reasons.  But what if I am still deliberating?  I see a consideration as making p more likely but I 
also see another one which puts p in question. We have been presented with the counterfactual 
that says if we find reasons convincing and settle the question that p, then those reasons are 
constitutive. But what are we to say of considerations discarded in the process of deliberation?  
They seem to bear on whether p because if I ever were to settle the question I would then believe, 
but what if, in the end, my settling the question did not take these in account at all? Do they lose 
their status as reasons, or reasons of the right kind? And what if I never settle the question, or the 
question that concerns me is fundamentally unsettle-able?  
These considerations suggest that if one were not already convinced that certain type of 
reasons (usually called “evidential”) were the right kinds and that another type (often called 
practical) were the wrong kind, this constitutive/extrinsic distinction need not capture the same 
distinction. It remains open that practical reasons can help settle the question whether p, and it 
also seems that evidential considerations still count as reasons even if they bear on questions that 
can never be settled. 
Mark Schroeder has criticized Hieronymi’s approach, as well as many others, to the WKR 
problem by arguing that their scope is too narrow. Schroeder views the problem as one that is very 
general, that arises for any state or activity governed by standards of correctness, and so a solution, 
he thinks should also be very general. Hieronymi is clear that her approach only applies to what 
she terms “commitment-constituting” attitudes, that is attitudes that one can form or revise simply 
by settling for oneself a question. One is “committed, in the sense that if one has the attitude, one 
is answerable to certain questions and criticisms --- namely those questions and criticisms would be 
answered by the considerations that bear on those relevant question(s). So, for example, if I believe 
p then I am committed to p, that is I am answerable to questions and criticisms that would be 
answered by the considerations that bear on whether p.”  (450) 
 These attitudes include intentions and beliefs, and Hieronymi is inclined to think they could 
include much more. But this distinction cannot be drawn, she says for all attitudes or rational 
activity; it cannot be drawn in the case of “ordinary actions”; one does not act simply by settling 
the question whether to act. Schroeder thinks one can generate the same kind of problem for all 
kinds of actions, for example, the activity of tying a knot. Since my discussion here is limited to 
 
3 The reasoning may not be as bad as it appears. Something like “The only way that believing the butler did it will save 
my life is if the butler did it” could be a suppressed premise. 
4 We will see an example of such an argument when discussing Nishi Shah’s view. 
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reasons for belief, I am only interested in what his solution tells us about reasons for believing, and 
if it does, in fact rule out practical reasons for belief as being “genuine” reasons. Schroeder thinks 
it is important to note that “wrong kinds of reasons” are almost always relativized to a particular 
subject and context (often involving evil demons or eccentric billionaires) and so are 
“idiosyncratic” whereas right kind of reasons are universal in some sense. Here is his 
characterization of a right kind of reason (RKR):  
 
“The right kind of reasons with respect to any activity, A, are all and only those reasons which are 
shared by necessarily every able person engaging in A, because they are engaged in A, together with 
all reasons which are derivative from such reasons.” (2010, 39) 
 
 The idea is that if an activity has standards of correctness, these standards provide reasons 
for anyone engaged in that activity; “only the ‘right’ kind contribute to standards of correctness.” 
If, for example, you are engaged in the activity of playing chess then you have a reason to move 
your bishop diagonally and not horizontally, and if you are trying to execute a particular endgame 
you have reason to move your rook one way and not another: “Placing one’s rook in the third rank 
is an incorrect way to execute the Lucena endgame position, but it is the correct way to throw the 
match – so the very same action can be the correct way of doing one thing but an incorrect way of 
doing another.”  
What does it mean for a reason to “contribute” to a standard of correctness? In executing an 
endgame you have a reason to move your rook one way rather than another because doing so will 
help you succeed in the execution. In the activity of tying a knot, you have a reason to manipulate 
the rope or string in such a way that they cohere together; you must have a minimal aim that these 
pieces of rope or string achieve at least some cohesion, and anyone engaged in tying knots will 
“share any reasons that arise from this aim.” (40) This is why the eccentric millionaire’s offer of a 
huge sum of money to just lay one rope on top of the other does not provide you with a reason to 
tie knots that way; it is not a “tying knot” reason.  No such incentive affects the correct way to tie a 
knot. 
In these cases, that of executing endgames and tying knots, it is clear that standards of 
correctness are tied to aims; the standards are there to help achieve specific aims, and the right 
kind of reasons are the ones that, in principle, help us achieve these aims. But Schroeder’s 
approach is supposed to apply to mental states as well. Do these all have standards of correctness, 
and if they do, can they be tied to aims in a way that allows us to make sense of reasons which 
“contribute” to those standards and those that do not?  Schroeder considers the case of admiring, 
realizing that figuring out standards of correctness will be more complicated than in the case of an 
intentional activity like tying a knot. He argues, however, that “there are going to be some 
important reasons shared by anyone who is engaged in admiring.” (42) Remember these reasons 
need to be tied in some sense to standards of correctness, and so we need to say something about 
what it is to admire such that one can do so correctly or incorrectly. Schroeder considers a couple 
of ways we might do this. The first appeals to facts about admiring; perhaps it is a fact that if one 
admires someone one is motivated to emulate that person and so anyone engaged in admiring only 
has a reason to admire someone if it would not be bad to emulate them. Or maybe we have 
standing reason to not have false mental representations and “if admiration is an attitude which 
represents its objects as being in a certain way… then we can take the view that having the attitude 
of admiration triggers these reasons not to have false representations, by giving you reasons not to 
admire people who lack the feature that admiration represents people as having.” (42) 
While Schroeder says that his initial characterization, and solution to the WKR problem, 
leaves open which activities have standards of correctness, what they are, and how they generate 
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reasons, his brief discussion of the attitude of admiring suggests that while his approach works for 
actions (as Hieronymi’s does not), it is far from straightforward how it applies to attitudes which is 
where the WKR problem is generated. When it comes to admiring, the only shared reasons he has 
suggested are reasons not to admire; one has a reason not to admire someone it would be bad to 
emulate or not to admire someone who lacks feature x; this sounds very close to saying one has 
reason not to admire someone who is not admirable. But are there any shared reasons to admire 
for anyone engaged in the “activity” of admiring in a way analogous to there being shared reasons 
to manipulate string a certain way for anyone engaged in the activity of rope-tying?  So many of 
these may well be idiosyncratic which was supposed to be a hallmark of the wrong kind of reasons. 
Given my desires and preferences it seems I may have a reason to admire someone who you do not, 
even if we share reasons not to admire someone wholly despicable.5 
 Schroeder says he conceives of believing as an activity and mentions it as one of those to 
which the WKR problem arises but he does not discuss it directly as one of his examples.  How 
would the standard of correctness for belief need to be characterized such that practical reasons 
were necessarily the wrong kind of reasons for belief? While one may question whether the 
attitude of admiration even has a standard of correctness, beliefs clearly do. A belief’s standard of 
correctness is truth. But what does this standard tell us about reasons for belief? It can tell us we 
have a reason not to believe falsehoods. Taken in one way this is a platitude which any believer 
accepts, in some sense must accept. If I believe something I take it that what I believe is true; I 
cannot believe what I take to be false. But this is a long way from ruling out a class of 
considerations as reasons to believe. Again, as was the case when thinking about Hieronymi’s 
solution, it is useful to think about doxastic deliberation; when I am trying to figure out what to 
believe is when I am most clearly considering reasons for and against the belief, not when I am 
already fully committed. Nothing about belief’s standard of correctness alone dictates what the 
content or nature of a reason for belief must be. And what we often find is a mixture of different 
kind of considerations when engaged in such deliberation. Consider this example: 
 
Referee: Geoff, an experienced referee, is refereeing a high school soccer match. He blows his 
whistle, declaring that a player is offside. He can see from the reactions of both teams, and the 
fans, that they think the call was mistaken. Based on this new evidence he asks himself “What 
should I believe? Should I believe I made I mistake? Should I revise my belief that the player was 
off-side?” In the process of this deliberation, Geoff considers that if he were to revise his belief or 
now believe he made a mistake, he would both (a) replay the past event in his head to try check if 
he made a mistake and (b) overanalyze future events.  The former increases the chances he will 
miss crucial evidence in the future while the latter increases the chances that he will draw the 
wrong conclusion from the evidence he does collect.  In either case, he will be a poorer judge or 
collector of the evidence as the game proceeds, thus making him both an inferior epistemic agent, 
as well as worse referee. He continues to believe the call was correct and the player was indeed off-
side. 
  
 The considerations that bear on whether Geoff should maintain his belief (even from 
Geoff’s perspective) are not all evidential; he is also thinking about whether it would be good for 
him to maintain his belief and bad for him to revise it; the fact that it would make him a worse 
referee if he were to revise is salient in his deliberation, but this is clearly a non-evidential reason. 
If he is right that he also has reason to maintain his belief because doing so will allow him to form 
more true beliefs in the future then some of the non-evidential reasons may be what Brian Talbot 
 
5 For discussion and criticisms of Schroeder’s view along similar lines see Sharadin (2013) 
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has called “truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.” (Talbot, 2014) If this is the case 
then we can see even more clearly that belief’s standard of correctness will not decide, in a simple 
way, that only considerations of a certain kind count as reasons for belief. Now if one is already 
committed to the view that the only genuine reasons for belief are evidential, one will find a way of 
re-describing this case (and others like it) that does not undermine that view. But another kind of 
argument is needed to show that practical reasons are reasons of the wrong kind. 6 
 
3. The nature of belief   
Both Schroeder and Hieronymi are interested in getting a deeper understanding of the nature 
of reasons in general, but others have argued that one can grasp why only certain kinds of reasons 
are reasons for belief by thinking more specifically about the nature and norms of belief. These 
solutions may not be able to address wider issues generated by the WKR problem, but that is not 
my concern here.  
I have discussed this approach at length elsewhere7 and so will be fairly brief in my discussion 
here. We saw that there is a straightforward way to tie reasons to standards of correctness in the 
cases of activities that have aims.  While the idea of admiring having an aim seems odd, it is quite 
common to find talk of the aim of belief, and most construe the aim as truth.  If beliefs (or 
believing?) have an aim, this could provide a way of revealing which reasons are of the right kind 
and which are not, depending on whether they help achieve the aim. While Bernard Williams 
(1973) was the first to explicitly introduce the idea of beliefs aiming at truth, this idea has been 
expanded and elaborated in many ways more recently. One common way of making sense of 
Williams’s idea that beliefs “aim at truth,” is to argue that beliefs are governed by, and only by, 
truth-related norms.  “Normativism” about belief has become very widespread; on this view it is 
built into what it is to be a belief (as opposed to some other sort of mental attitude) that beliefs are 
subject to certain norms, and, while there is some disagreement of how to characterize these 
constitutive norms, it is agreed that they are alethic, or epistemic.8  Further, on this view, the only 
reasons for believing must be reasons that relate to the truth. In some sense, these accounts bring 
together Hironymi’s observations about constitutive reasons, and Schroeder’s ideas about 
standards of correctness. 
While one can find many examples of discussions of the nature of belief which purport to 
explain why practical reasons are not really reasons for belief, Nishi Shah’s (2003, 2006) discussion 
is the most explicit in its defense of this view. Further, I emphasized that when thinking about 
what kinds of considerations count as reasons for belief, we should think about considerations 
that arise in the context of doxastic deliberation, and Shah agrees. Yet he thinks that reflecting on 
 
6 In (2017) I discuss the Referee example as well as some other cases where it appears agents have practical reasons to 
believe. There are many ways that one can re-describe this case to preserve the idea that only right kind of reasons for 
belief are ones that raise the probability of the belief being true. One could say that the non-evidential reasons are not 
reasons which bear on whether or not to revise one’s belief but instead bear on one’s broader epistemic goals. Or one 
might suggest that these are reasons which bear on Geoff’s action, namely the making of the call. I present cases like 
this not as way of demonstrating that they conclusively show that practical reasons can be genuine reasons for belief, 
but to try to show that in a very natural way of thinking about doxastic deliberation, non-evidential considerations are 
salient. If there are independent reasons for thinking that such cases cannot exist, then the motivation for such re-
descriptions are clear. But whether such independent reasons have been given exactly what I am questioning.  
7 In (2015) and (2017) 
8 For a helpful recent discussion of normativism about belief see Nolfi (2015). Among those Nolfi cites as endorsing 
normativism are Jonathan Adler, Allan Gibbard, Peter Graham, Peter Railton, Nishi Shah, Ernest Sosa and Ralph 
Wedgwood. Stephanie Leary (2016) argues that the strategy of appealing to the constitutive standards of correctness of 
belief to rule out non-evidential reasons for beliefs fails. 
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such deliberation will help to reveal why only evidential considerations can be reasons. Shah 
begins with what he takes to be a fact about such deliberation. He says that when we reason, or 
deliberate, about what to believe, then only truth-related questions matter; we are concerned only 
with evidence. Shah calls this phenomenon “transparency”; the question whether to believe that 
p collapses into the question of whether p is true. He first introduces this idea when contrasting 
beliefs formed in a deliberative context and when they are not, posing what he calls the 
“teleologist’s dilemma.” 
In many contexts in which we form beliefs, or are caused to have beliefs, non-evidential 
processes such as wishful thinking are responsible. If the teleologist, weakens the disposition to 
form true beliefs to allow for cases of wishful thinking and other non-evidential processes, then 
they cannot explain why evidence plays an exclusive role in reasoning about what to believe. To 
account for this, the teleologist would have to strengthen the aiming-at-truth disposition so as to 
exclude influence of non-truth-regarding considerations. Shah’s problem is summarized as follows: 
“We need an account that explains why deliberative belief- formation is regulated solely by a 
disposition to be moved by alethic considerations, but doesn’t require non-deliberative instances of 
belief- formation be also solely regulated by such a disposition.”(2003, 467)  His way out of the 
dilemma is to emphasize the conceptual necessity of truth being the standard of correctness for 
belief; built into the concept of belief is the idea that a correct belief is a true one. Here is a clear 
statement of what he takes that to imply: “To say that it is a conceptual rather than merely 
metaphysical matter that truth is the standard of correctness for belief is to say that a competent 
user of the concept of belief must accept the prescription to believe p only if p is true for any 
activity that he conceives of as belief-formation.” (2003, 470) This understanding of the 
connection between belief and truth offers a way out of the teleologist’s dilemma. According to 
Shah, when one applies the concept in one’s reasoning, truth-relevant considerations must be 
applied; but in non-deliberative contexts where the concept is not exercised, one’s cognitive activity 
need not be regulated by truth-relevant dispositions. 
Shah further argues that reflection on transparency can help to show the truth of 
evidentialism. Evidentialism, he argues, is “built in” to the nature of doxastic deliberation. Although 
transparency does not immediately imply evidentialism (namely, the view that only evidence can 
serve as a reason for belief), it is so implied when coupled with what Shah calls “the deliberative 
constraint on reasons.” This constraint tells us that something can be a reason to X only if it 
is possible for it to function as a premise in deliberation to X. When this constraint is applied to 
belief, the following holds: 
R is a reason for X to believe that p only if R is capable of disposing X towards believing that p in a 
way characteristic of R’s functioning as a premise in doxastic deliberation. 
 
Given that transparency shows that questions related to the truth of p are the sole focus of our 
attention in doxastic deliberation, when it is combined with the deliberative constraint, pragmatic 
considerations for believing are shown to be impossible. Practical reasons focus on the attractiveness 
of doing something but nothing about the attractiveness of believing (aside from whether is true), if 
we accept transparency, can serve as reason for believing from the perspective of the believer. 
From my discussion so far it should be clear that I am questioning what is often taken as 
unquestionable fact (either a contingent, but universal one, or a conceptually necessary one), 
namely that “the deliberative question whether to believe that p inevitably gives way to the factual 
question whether p.” This characterization does not exhaust the ways in which we consider the 
question whether to believe p.  Non-alethic considerations can be part of even first-person doxastic 
deliberation. Further, even if there is a sense in which the question whether to believe p ends up 
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collapsing into the question whether p, it is not clear that all the considerations opposed to or in 
favor of p are strictly “evidential.” 
  In thinking about the Referee case, Shah could allow that non-evidential factors enter into 
the causes of Geoff’s belief, what is precluded by his account is that Geoff could view such non-
alethic considerations as reasons to believe. But why can’t such practical considerations be reasons 
for belief? The deliberative constraint on reasons says a consideration can only be a reason to x if it 
is capable of “functioning as a premise” in deliberation to x. Now, if deliberation is characterized as 
a kind of deductive argument with premises and conclusions, it would certainly be very odd for a 
practical consideration to function as a premise in whether to believe something. To say I am hungry 
and tired and, therefore, the witness is innocent is very bad reasoning, though, again, not obviously 
impossible. But, is deliberation really best understood as an argument with the conclusion being an 
action or belief? 
In thinking about practical deliberation, it seems we deliberate when it is not immediately clear 
what to do; it is usually when there are reasons supporting different, often conflicting, actions. I 
have to decide whether I should stay home and grade, or go see my friend’s band play. What goes 
on when I deliberate about this? It seems I make a kind of list of considerations in favor and opposed 
to each course of action. Some people even transfer this mental list on to actual paper to assist in 
their deliberation. If, in the end, I decide to stay home and grade, it seems anything that came up in 
that list can be a reason for my staying home and grading. But did it function as premise? Would it 
make sense to think of my deliberative process along these lines: 
If I don’t grade tonight it will just make things worse for me tomorrow. Things being worse for 
me tomorrow is something I should avoid. Therefore, I should grade. 
 
One can reconstruct practical reasoning in such a way, though it bears little resemblance to what 
I think actually goes on in such deliberation. And its conclusion is not an actual action but a 
normative statement. If weak-willed actions are possible, I may go through that process and still go 
out to the show. This way of thinking about deliberation fails to capture, for example, all the 
considerations that were rejected that supported another course of action. Now Shah is not 
committed to saying something can only be a reason if it actually functions as a premise in 
deliberation; it must only be capable of doing so. But it seems all considerations that arise during the 
course of deliberation, even if they are rejected or overshadowed, should count as possible reasons, 
though it is hard to see how to reconstruct such complex, and somewhat messy, thoughts into 
argument form. 
In addressing the question of what is going on when it seems as if practical considerations function 
as reasons in deliberation about whether to believe something, Shah considers a number of 
explanations. One is that an agent can be mistaken about what counts as evidence. If someone takes 
it as a general principle that if something is good for him, it is probably true, then it is possible that 
when thinking about whether to believe something, such a person would think that facts about his 
good provide him with reasons to believe. Shah says such a person is not mistaking a practical 
consideration for an evidential one, but is accepting an unwarranted evidential principle. So, though 
a third-person perspective can indicate that his belief is not based on evidential reasons, from a first-
person perspective, the agent mistakenly sees desirability as an indicator of truth. What Shah thinks 
these examples usually reveal, however, is a conflation of the question of whether to bring about the 
belief, and the question of whether to believe. This brings us back to Hieronymi’s way of 
distinguishing between the two kinds of reasons by thinking about the questions upon which they 
bear and, once again, I question whether there is a class or kind of considerations that can be 
delineated which bears on one, but not the other. 
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4. The basing relation  
 
Evidentialists tend to not be fazed by examples (like Referee) which purport to show that 
practical reasons can be reasons for belief.9 All will admit that non-evidential considerations, in 
fact, can contribute causally to what one believes. Many (though not all) will even say that such 
considerations can count as reasons for these subjects to believe and, again, such reasons may 
partially cause the beliefs. What they deny, however, is that these non-evidential reasons are 
reasons for which these subjects believe; beliefs, they say, cannot be based on such reasons.  To try 
to articulate what it means for a believe to be based on reason, as opposed to the reason simply 
being one of the causes of the belief is not simple and philosophers disagree on the nature of the 
relationship. The Referee example is supposed to provide a case where one’s beliefs are, at least 
partly, so based.  As I said, if one is already convinced that such reasons are ruled out, then one 
will try to explain cases like this away. We have seen that some argue that the proper way to 
think about reasons rules them out, and others think that careful reflection on the nature of 
belief rules them out. Still others think understanding what it means for a belief to be based on a 
reason reveals that beliefs cannot be based on practical reasons, and if this true, this reveals why 
they are not really reasons.  
To assess whether it is the case that there is a whole class of reasons on which beliefs cannot be 
based, we need some understanding of the basing relation. But providing a characterization of this 
relation has proved extremely difficult, though there is much recent (and current) work being done 
trying to clarify it. It should be noted that the motivation to gain a clearer understanding of the 
basing relation is usually that doing so will help us understand what kind of relationship is 
required between a belief and a reason so that one is doxastically justified in holding the belief. 
Often these discussions assume that there are reasons to justify the proposition believed (and this is 
termed “propositional justification”) but for the attitude of belief to be justified by this reason, it 
must be based on this reason, but what does it mean to be so based?10 
The relationship cannot be simply causal as many causes of beliefs may not be reasons at all, let 
alone reasons for which one believes. As Korcz puts it “given that in principle anything can cause 
anything, a causal account of the basing relation will allow beliefs to be based on reasons which 
seem completely unrelated to them. For instance, one's belief about having ridden a zebra once 
might, in principle, cause one to believe that Queen Elizabeth was a member of the Mafia.” (545)  
 In trying provide an account of the relation, some stick to a general causal story but try to 
articulate the appropriate kind of causation so as to rule out deviant causal chains while others have 
abandoned that approach in favor of what are sometimes termed “doxastic” accounts which state 
that a belief is only based on a reason if one has a meta-belief that the appropriate relation holds. 
Still others are searching for an alternative to either of these general approaches. I do not have 
space here to discuss and evaluate all these accounts. Instead I will present a number of alternative 
 
9 See footnote 6 for some ways of responding to these cases. Another strategy is to argue that practical reasons could 
not be the kinds of reasons that determine whether one has knowledge and only reasons that are genuine reasons are 
those such that if one has a true non-Gettiered belief that one would have knowledge. This kind of view is very much 
like the one that appeals to the truth aim or norm, but instead appeals to knowledge as belief’s aim or norm. But 
again, what rules out that such considerations could bear on knowledge in a significant way? Any theory which allows 
for pragmatic encroachment on knowledge is allowing that practical considerations are not wholly irrelevant to 
whether one knows. Further such a view seems to commit one to a particular view of knowledge which  precludes that 
one can have perfectly reasonable belief even when one is not in a position to know.   
10 The distinction is also sometimes made in terms of a belief being justifiable and beliefs being justified. This is, for 
example, how Korcz (2000) introduces his discussion. For helpful discussion of what the relation is trying to identify 
see also McCain (2012) and Neta (ms.) 
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representative accounts and argue only pure doxastic accounts are likely to show that the basing 
relation rules out a particular category of reason. Now if one is already convinced that such reasons 
are the wrong kind of reasons for belief, that doxastic theories can show why this is so, will count 
in their favor. But such accounts have been criticized on many grounds and if one rejects them in 
favor of any kind of causal or dispositional account, then one will not be in a position to designate 
a class of reason as being reasons of the wrong kind by appeal to the nature of the basing relation. 
Kurt Sylvan (2016) has recently presented a helpful survey and discussion of recent accounts of 
the basing relation, and some of what follows is indebted to his way of carving up the terrain. The 
first amendment to a simple causal view is to state that a belief is only based on a reason if the 
reason “causally sustains the belief.” The central idea of such a view, and which many more 
complicated theories retain, is that if the reason upon which the belief is based is lost then so is 
the belief.  But just as causes can seem unrelated to the beliefs they cause so can causal sustainers. 
As John Turri points out, we can imagine “that through some random quirk— the result of a 
neural assembly malfunctioning— Wilt’ s belief that the lettuce wilted [causally sustains] his belief 
that the Patriots will win twelve games this season.”  
To avoid non-deviant causes, Turri introduces the idea of a cognitive trait; a reason non-
deviantly causes your belief if it manifests your cognitive traits. He ends with this account of the 
basing relation: “R is among your reasons for believing Q if and only if R’s causing your belief 
manifests (at least some of) your cognitive traits.” 
 Sylvan points out that it is unclear that the cognitive trait requirement blocks all deviance 
counterexamples, however. He considers this example modified from Boghossian (2014: 4). “A 
pessimistic character might be regularly caused to think ‘Yet so much food is bad’ whenever he 
thinks ‘Some food is good’. The fact that this transition manifests his pessimistic character makes 
no difference to the intuition that he doesn’t base his belief that so much food is bad on his belief 
that some food is good.” 
 To overcome the problem of causal deviance (as well as others) many recent theories have 
tried to articulate a way in which an agent must “treat” the consideration that causally sustains her 
belief as a reason. This “treating condition” can be characterized in many ways. One way is in 
terms of an agent’s dispositions. Ian Evans (2013) has recently argued for a dispositional account, 
characterizing the basing relation as follows: 
  
S’s belief that p is based on m iff S is disposed to revise her belief that p when she loses m. 
 
 On such a view your dispositions reveal whether you “treat” a consideration as a reason. 
More complex accounts of what it is to “treat” something as a reason are found in Lord and Sylvan 
(ms.) and Neta (ms.). Sylvan summarizes such views of the basing relation as follows: 
 
It is true that S believes q for reason p because “S treats p-like considerations as normative reasons 
to believe q-like propositions and as a manifestation of that fact, S’ s belief that p explains why S 
believes that q.” 
 
 Most views which incorporate a “treating” condition do not rule out practical reasons as 
being reasons for which one can believe. In Neta’s discussion he provides examples to help 
illuminate the connection between the agent and the reason so that it provides what is needed, 
and he says:  
[I]t is possible for an agent to C for the reason R even when she doesn’t know what her 
reason for C’ing is:  this is quite common for mature humans, and even more common for 
the less mature.  There might be reasons for which I am angry at my parents, but I might 
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not know what those reasons are:  I can represent an explanatory relation even if I fail to 
represent some of its relata, just as I can represent a whole even if I fail to represent its 
parts. Also, my account of the basing relation is consistent with an agent’s C’ing for the 
reason R even when she also believes that R is not a good reason for C’ing…It’s possible for 
an agent to represent an explanatory relation between her reasons and her RDC [rationally 
determinable condition, e.e belief] even when she is not attentively representing it:  when 
acquiring a skill (e.g., speaking a language, playing a musical instrument, or using Kung 
Fu), we learn to do various things for various reasons, and to do so quickly and without 
deliberation or attentive reflection…The musician might not know why she plays a passage 
in just the way she does, and the Kung Fu expert might not know exactly why she moves in 
just the way she does, but either expert might come to know the reasons for which she does 
these things if she reflects skillfully upon those reasons. (ms, 35-56)  
  
The only candidates for accounts of basing which rule out practical reasons as being genuine 
reasons are those which require one have fully conscious meta-beliefs about the normative status of 
these reasons. Such views have been criticized for having an overly intellectualist view of what is 
required for a belief to be based on a reason, and they also seem to commit one to a very strong 
kind of internalism; in fact this has been seen by some as one of their virtues. Further, one may 
wonder if one needs to have meta-beliefs about those meta-beliefs, and further meta-meta beliefs, 
leading to an infinite regress of higher order beliefs. 11Now it may be that even such views do not 
rule out practical reasons for belief.  It is possible in certain cases for agents to recognize their non-
evidential reasons for believing.; you can see that some of the considerations sustaining your belief 
that your lover is faithful are non-evidential. But that one needs to be able to recognize one’s reason 
for believing once one believes seems an overly demanding constraint on what is required to believe 
for a reason. Consider an ordinary case of believing for an evidential reason. You believe the match 
will go ahead and the reason you believe this is that it is sunny.  If we accept Shah’s strong 
constraint on reasons, namely that for a consideration to be a reason for you to , it must be a 
consideration from which you could reason to  -ing then what makes the fact that it is sunny 
outside a reason for your belief is that this fact is used in your reasoning to the conclusion that the 
match will go ahead.  Again, in the cases I have presented, the agents do just that. What gives this 
constraint plausibility is that reasons should guide us. But to add the further constraint that for a 
consideration to be a reason one must have full conscious awareness of the reasons for which one 
s would imply that we rarely believe (or act for that matter) for reasons. You form the belief that 
the match will go ahead and so go to the match. If you do not maintain full consciousness of why 
you so believe, do you thereby no longer believe for a reason?12 
 
5. Conclusion: Good and bad, not right and wrong 
 
 
11 McCain (2016) brings up this objection, as well as many other problems with doxastic accounts in 
Chapter 7. 
12 Jonathan Way (2016) has argued that for the constraint on reasoning to preclude non-evidential reasons 
for belief it needs to be this very strong constraint, but unlike the weaker constraint that just says it needs to 
be capable of motivating or of operating in deliberation or reasoning “the condition looks gerrymandered 
to support an argument for evidentialism.” (812) Susanna Rinard (2015) has recently argued that the 
characterizations of the basing relation which rule out non-evidential reasons for belief rule out a lot more, 
namely they rule out non-evidential reasons for action as well. 
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For all I have said here it may be the case that practical reasons are never good reasons for 
beliefs; perhaps beliefs based on such reasons are always improperly based.13 But an account of the 
basing relation should not only explain when beliefs are properly based. In Ram Neta’s recent 
discussion he argues that one of the conditions that a theory of the basing relation should meet is 
that it can explain the difference between proper and improper basing. On his view, for example, 
one can be mistaken in one’s representation of a consideration as a reason. Korcz makes a similar 
point when discussing deviant causes. He argues that there is no principled way of ruling out the 
reasons causing one’s Queen Elizabeth belief as being different in kind from what we often take to 
be very bad reasons. He summarizes his point as follows “any account of the basing relation which 
denies a mental state the status of being a reason simply because it seems to be a very bad one is 
likely to face serious counter-examples (545).”  
If there were a way to rule out practical reasons as being genuine reasons for belief then there 
would not be any need to ask the further question as to whether it can ever be permissible to 
believe for such reasons. Jonathan Adler, for example, was explicit in taking this approach in his 
Beliefs’ Own Ethics. One of his central contentions is that it is a mistake to appeal to “normative 
notions” in assessing what to believe. He refers to such approaches as “extrinsic,” and he argues 
that this notion is based on a faulty assumption, namely that the concept of belief alone does not 
fix the ethics of belief. Beliefs, he maintains, have their own “ethics,” discovered by a clear analysis 
of the concept of belief. And such an analysis, he claims, shows that we must believe according to 
the evidence and that any mental state based on practical reasons is not really a belief. 
If I am right that there is no way, in principle, to rule out practical reasons for belief, except 
perhaps by adopting some very contentious views, then the argument between evidentialists and 
pragmatists must be conducted at the level which we find in the classic debate between Clifford 
and James. The evidentialist must show that even if one can believe for non-evidential reasons, we 
ought only believe according to the evidence. 
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